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Abstract—MANET routing protocols are designed based on
the assumption that all nodes cooperate without maliciously
disrupting the operation of the routing protocol. A large number
of attack types of varying severity are threatening MANET.
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) is a well-known reactive MANET
routing protocol that does not support security of routing mes-
sages. In this paper, we study the performance of both DSR
and its flow-state extension routing protocols in the presence of
blackhole, grayhole, selfish and flooding attacks. We conclude
that the performance of flow-state DSR is better than DSR in the
presence of all attacks. Flooding attacks are found to dramatically
impact all the standard performance metrics. Blackhole attacks
significantly worse the packet delivery ratio in a static network
using unmodified DSR. All the attacks greatly increase the end-
to-end delay; an effect particularly marked in a static network.
Keywords—MANET, Routing, DSR, Flow-state, Security, At-
tack, Flooding, Grayhole, Blackhole, Selfish
I. INTRODUCTION
A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a decentralized
infrastructureless network in which nodes cooperate to forward
data from a source to a destination. Each node in a MANET
acts both as a router and as a host. Several routing protocols
have been designed for MANETs [5] to optimize network
routing performance. The major issues involved in designing
a routing protocol for MANET are nodes mobility, bandwidth
constrained and error prone wireless channel, resource con-
strained nodes, and dynamic changing of the network topology
[1].
MANET routing protocols can be classified as proactive or
reactive routing protocols. In proactive (table-driven) routing
protocols, each node maintains one or more tables containing
routing information to every other node in the network. While
in reactive (on-demand) routing protocols, routes are created
whenever a source requires to send data to a destination node
which means that these protocols are initiated by a source
on-demand. In this paper, we focus on the Dynamic Source
Routing protocol (DSR) [18] which is an extensively studied
reactive protocol.
Conventional MANET routing protocols assume that all
nodes cooperate without maliciously disrupting the operation
of the protocol and do not provide defense against malicious
attackers. However, the existence of malicious nodes cannot be
ignored in computer networks, especially in MANETs because
of the wireless nature of the network. MANET inherits security
threats that are faced in wired as well as wireless networks
and also introduces security attacks unique to itself [13] due
its characteristics. Nodes in MANET have limited computation
and power capabilities that make the network more vulnerable
to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. It is difficult to implement
cryptography and key management algorithms which need
substantial computations like public key algorithms. Node
mobility introduces also a difficulty of distinguishing between
stale routes and fake routes. A malicious node can attack the
network layer in MANET either by not forwarding packets
or by changing some parameters of routing messages such
as sequence number and IP addresses, sending fake messages
several times and sending fake routing information to disrupt
routing operations. A large number of attacks on MANET [21]
are known and much effort has been made to solve them.
Simulation studies have shown the impact of such attacks and
the effectiveness of proposed defence mechanisms [17] [22].
Security mechanisms are added to existing routing pro-
tocols to resist attacks. Cryptographic techniques are used
to ensure the authenticity and integrity of routing messages
[12]. A major concern is the trade off between security and
performance, given the limited resources available at many
MANET nodes. Both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography
have been used as well as hash chaining. Examples of these
security enhanced protocols are Authenticated Routing for
Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN) [19], Secure Link State Routing
Protocol (SLSP) [16], and Secure Ad-hoc On-demand Distance
Vector routing (SAODV) [23]. In addition to the power and
computation cost of using cryptographic techniques, the perfor-
mance of secured mechanism is worse than non-secured in the
presence of some attacks [3]. Securing the routing messages
does not guarantee the detection of these malicious nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
an overview of the DSR and its flow-state extension routing
protocols is presented. In Section III, the impact of some
attacks on MANET is discussed. In Section IV, the simulation
approach and parameters is presented. In Section V, simulation
results are given. In Section VI, conclusions are drawn.
II. DSR AND ITS IMPROVEMENTS
DSR [10] is one of the most well-known MANET reac-
tive protocols. The protocol is an on-demand source routing
protocol which means that the data packets contain a list of
nodes representing the route to be followed and the routes
are created whenever a source node requires to send data to
a destination node. The protocol consists of two mechanisms
which are route discovery and route maintenance. Nodes using
DSR may cache multiple routes to a single destination, and
may use any of these routes at any time for any packet being
sent. When a source node aims to send a packet, it firstly
consults its route cache. If the required route is available, the
source node includes the routing information inside the data
packet before sending it. Otherwise, the source node initiates
a route discovery operation by broadcasting a route request
RREQ packet. Receiving a RREQ packet, a node checks its
route cache and replies from its cache if it has a route to
the destination. If the node does not have routing information
for the requested destination, it appends its own address to the
route record field of the RREQ packet and locally rebroadcasts
the RREQ packet to its neighbors. The destination node
generates a route reply RREP packet that includes the list of
addresses received in the RREQ and unicasts it back along this
path to the source and stores this route in its route cache for
possible use on subsequent packets. Each node on the route is
responsible for confirming that the packet has been received
by the next node in the route and retransmitting the packet
if necessary. If no confirmation is received after a limited
number of retransmission attempts for the packet, the link from
this node to the next hop is considered to have broken, and
the route maintenance mechanism sends a route error RERR
packet to the source node identifying this broken link. The
source node then removes this broken link from its route cache;
for subsequent packets to this same destination, and uses an
alternate route that it may already have in its route cache or
may re-invoke route discovery to discover a new route to this
destination.
A number of optimizations that improve the performance
of the basic DSR have been introduced [11] [8]. If a node
receives RREQ has a route to the source in its route cache,
it may reply from its cache by appending its cached route to
the received RREQ route. A node may also update its route
cache based on source routes or other routing information
that it forwards by optionally operating its network interface
hardware in “promiscuous” receive mode. After a node detects
a broken link and returns a RERR to the source, the node
may attempt to salvage the packet if it has a different route to
the destination in its own route cache; it replaces the original
route with the route from its cache and transmits the packet
to the new next hop node. DSR can support automatic route
shortening to allow source routes in use to be shortened when
possible, for example when nodes move close enough together
so that one or more intermediate hops are no longer necessary.
If a node is able to promiscuously receive a packet not intended
for it as the next hop, then this node returns a “gratuitous”
RREP to the source of the packet; this reply gives a shorter
route that does not include the intermediate nodes between the
node that transmitted the packet and this node.
One of the most important optimizations of DSR is a
flow state extension [9]. It allows the routing of most packets
without an explicit source route header in the packet. A source
node sending packets to a destination node uses implicit source
routing to establish a route to that destination as a flow. Each
node participating in implicit source routing has a flow table,
with one entry for each flow forwarded by that node. The
flow table has to record the next hop address to which a
packet for this flow should be forwarded, in addition to the
source address, destination address, and flow identifier for this
flow. A source can establish a new flow by sending a flow
establishment packet that has two headers: one containing the
flow identifier, and the other containing a source route and
a timeout for the flow. When an intermediate forwards this
packet, in addition to forwarding it according to the source
route information, it creates a flow table entry for this flow and
inserts the necessary information from the packet. A node is
required to remove a flow entry from the flow table when that
node has not forwarded packets for that flow for a period of
time specified by the timeout for the flow. A node forwarding
a packet sent using implicit source routing checks its flow
table for an entry corresponding to the flow identifier in the
packet. When a packet is sent using implicit source routing
forwarding, it still requires some small amount of overhead in
the packet. These additional header bytes in the packet can be
entirely eliminated by the use of default flows. From a given
source to a destination, any number of different flows may
exist and be in use. One of these flows may be considered to
be the ”default” flow from that source to that destination. A
node receiving a packet, with neither a DSR header specifying
the route to be taken nor a DSR Flow State header specifying
the flow to be followed, is forwarded along the default flow for
the source and destination addresses specified in the packet’s
IP header [11].
III. DSR SECURITY FLAWS
MANETs are more vulnerable to security attacks than fixed
networks due their inherent characteristics. MANET routing
protocols are designed based on the assumption that all nodes
cooperate without maliciously disrupting the operation of the
protocol. However, the existence of malicious nodes cannot be
disregarded in any system, especially in MANETs because of
the wireless nature of the network. A malicious node aims to
cause congestion, propagate fake routing information or disturb
nodes from providing services. The behavior of a malicious
node is to disrupt the operation of the DSR routing protocol
[2]. The malicious node can spoof source or destination IP
address, modify and/or generate fake routing packets. Attacks
against MANET are classified based on modification, imper-
sonation or fabrication of the routing messages. While there
is large number of existing attacks, our paper is focused on
flooding, grayhole, selfish and blackhole attacks.
A. DSR under Flooding Attack
In a flooding attack [7], a malicious node floods the
network with a large number of RREQs to non-existent
destinations in the network. Since the destination does not
exist in the network, a RREP packet cannot be generated
by any node in the network. When a large number of fake
RREQ packets are broadcast into the network, new routes can
no longer be added and the network is unable to transmit
data packets. This leads to congestion in the network and
overflow of route table in the intermediate nodes so that the
nodes cannot receive new RREQ packet, resulting in a DoS
attack. Moreover, unnecessary forwarding of these fake RREQ
packets has serious effects in MANET [4] as a result of limited
computational and power resources of nodes.
B. DSR under Blackhole Attack
In a blackhole attack [20], a malicious node absorbs the
network traffic and drops all packets. Once a malicious node
receives a RREQ packet from any other node, it immediately
sends a false RREP with a high sequence number and hop
count equals 1 to spoof its neighbours that it has the best
route to the destination. Thus, the malicious node reply will
be received by the source node before any other replies and
will be selected to send data packets through the route that
includes the malicious node. When the data packets routed by
the source node reach the blackhole node, it drops the packets
rather than forwarding them to the destination node.
C. DSR under Selfish Attack
In a selfish attack [6], a malicious node saves its resources;
such as battery, by not cooperating in the network operations.
A selfish node affects the network performance as it does not
correctly process routing or data packets based on the routing
protocol. The selfish node drops all data and control packets
even if these packets are sent to it. When a selfish node needs
to send data to another node, it starts working as normal DSR
operation. After it finishes sending its data, the node returns
to its silent mode and the selfish behavior.
D. DSR under Grayhole Attack
In a grayhole attack [14], a malicious node behaves nor-
mally as a truthful node by replying with true RREP packets
to the nodes that started RREQ packets. After the source node
starts sending data through the malicious node, the malicious
node starts dropping these data packets to launch a (DoS)
denial of service attack. So, the malicious node forwards
routing packets and drops data packets which makes grayhole
attacks much more difficult to detect.
IV. SIMULATION APPROACH
NS-2 simulator [15] is used to simulate grayhole, black-
hole, flooding and selfish attacks. The simulation is used to
analyse the performance of DSR and its flow-state extensions
routing protocols under these attacks. The parameters used
are shown in Table I. Node mobility was modelled with the
random waypoint method. Our simulation results are obtained
from 3 different movement scenarios, 3 different traffic sce-
narios and 3 different node-type (malicious or non-malicious)
scenarios which means that each metric value is the mean of
the 27 runs. The node-type scenario is created randomly. In all
cases, the 90% confidence interval was small compared with
the values being reported. While we examined the effects of the
attacks on both UDP and TCP traffic, in this paper we focused
on their impact on the TCP traffic only. We also examined the
effect of these attacks for different node speeds (0, 5, 10, 15,
20, 25 and 30 m/s). The paper results are focused only on the
static network and the highest mobility nodes (30 m/s).
TABLE I. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Simulation Time 180 s
Simulation Area 1000 m x 1000 m
Number of Nodes 100
Number of Connections 70
Number of Malicious Nodes 0 - 10
Node Speed 0 - 30 m/s
Pause Time 10 s
Traffic Type TCP
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): The ratio of packets that are
successfully delivered to a destination compared to the number
of packets that have been sent out by the sender.
Throughput: The number of data bits delivered to the appli-
cation layer of destination node in unit time measured in bps.
End-to-End Delay (EED): The average time taken for a
packet to be transmitted across the network from source to
destination.
Routing Overhead: The number of routing packets for route
discovery and route maintenance needed to deliver the data
packets from sources to destinations.
Route Discovery Latency (RDL): The average delay between
the sending RREQ from a source and receiving the first
corresponding RREP.
Sent Data Packets: The total number of packets sent by all
source nodes during the simulation time which can represent
the bandwidth capacity of the wireless channel under attacks.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. DSR under Flooding Attack
Figure 1 shows the effect of flooding attack on the network
throughput. In static networks, flow extension DSR achieves
approximately double the throughput of original DSR. How-
ever when the network is highly mobile, the two protocols are
almost identical in terms of throughput. The figure shows that
the throughput of the network decreases 6% approximately for
each malicious node in the static network.
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Fig. 1. Throughput under Flooding Attack
The effect of flooding attack on the packet delivery ratio
is shown in Figure 2. While the flooding attack has small
impact on the PDR of the flow extension of DSR, its effect is
remarkable on the PDR of the original DSR specially for large
number of malicious nodes. Figure shows that the PDR of the
network decreases 1% approximately for each malicious node
regardless the nodes mobility.
The effect illustrated by PDR is more noticeable if we
combine it with the number of packets that can be sent which
is shown in Figure 3. The figure shows that the total number
of packets that can be sent is dramatically decreasing as the
number of malicious nodes increases. By combining Figure
2 and Figure 3, we see that when the number of received
packets is measured the effect of flooding is more dramatic.
As the number of malicious nodes increases, the number of
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Fig. 2. PDR under Flooding Attack
received packets reduces. With 10 malicious nodes, the number
is reduced to one third of the number received with no attack
taking place.
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Fig. 3. Send Data Packets under Flooding Attack
The effect of flooding attack on the end-end-delay is shown
in Figure 4. The result shows that there is no significant change
between the delay of both DSR and its flow extension in high
mobility nodes and this delay increases up to 15% if there
are 10 malicious nodes. On the other hand, the two protocols
increase the delay dramatically as the number of malicious
nodes increases up to approximately 100% if there are 10
malicious nodes.
Figure 5 shows the effect of flooding attack on the routing
overhead. While the routing overhead of both protocols has
slightly increased as the number of malicious nodes increases
in high mobility nodes, it increases dramatically as the number
of malicious nodes increases in static nodes. The figure shows
as well that the flow extension has a significantly lower
overhead than original DSR irrespective of the number of
malicious nodes in static network.
Figure 6 shows the effect of flooding attack on the routing
discovery latency. The result shows that the routing discovery
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Fig. 5. Routing Overhead under Flooding Attack
latency of original DSR is better than its flow extension
regardless of the nodes mobility. The figure shows as well that
RDL is increases slightly as the number of malicious nodes
increases.
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B. DSR under Blackhole Attack
Figure 7 shows the effect of blackhole attack on the net-
work throughput. While the throughput of the flow extension
of DSR is better than original DSR in a static network, there
is no observed difference in a high mobility network. The
figure shows as well that the throughput slightly increases
as the number of malicious nodes increases. This result is
slightly confusing as the attack improves the throughput. This
is because the blackhole nodes stop rebroadcasting the RREQ
which decreases the number of RREQ packets that leads to
free channel bandwidth for sending data.
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The effect of blackhole attack on the packet delivery ratio is
shown in Figure 8. While the blackhole attack has no impact
on the PDR of both protocols in static nodes, the PDR of
the original DSR is dramatically decreased as the number
of malicious nodes increases by approximately 1% for each
malicious node in high mobility nodes. As a result of the PDR
being nearly constant, the effect of blackhole attack on the
number of packets sent is represented by a graph which is
very similar to the throughput graph.
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The effect of blackhole attack on the end-end-delay is
shown in Fig 9. While the results show that the malicious
nodes have severe impact on the delay in static networks, the
delay in high mobility nodes is not affected so much by the
malicious nodes presence. The results show that the delay of
the two protocols is reduced as the number of malicious nodes
increases which is slightly paradoxical as the attack improves
the delay. This is a misleading result because the delay is only
measured on packets that reach their destinations and since the
blackhole nodes drop all the data routed through it, the number
of packets that will be considered in calculating the delay
decreases as the number of malicious nodes increases. So, the
routes that avoid blackhole nodes suffer less competition, and
hence reduced delay.
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Figure 10 shows the effect of blackhole attack on the
routing overhead. The routing overhead of DSR is approxi-
mately twice its corresponding value in its flow extension in
static network while there is no significant change in high
mobility nodes. In addition, the figure shows that while the
routing overhead increases as the number of malicious nodes
increases in high mobility nodes, it decreases as a result of
malicious nodes in static nodes. The static network results
are slightly confusing as the blackhole attack improves the
routing overhead. This is because the blackhole nodes stop
rebroadcasting the RREQ which decreases the number of
RREQ packets, one of factors used to measure the routing
overhead. On the other hand, the number of RREQ remains at
the same level in high mobility nodes which leads to a logical
result of increasing the total routing overhead.
Figure 11 shows the effect of blackhole attack on the
routing discovery latency. The routing discovery latency of
original DSR is better than its flow extension regardless the
nodes mobility. The figure shows as well that RDL is decreased
slightly as the number of malicious nodes increases. This
slightly confusing result is achieved because the fast response
of the blackhole nodes to RREQs decreases the delay time
between the RREQ and its corresponding RREP which leads to
improve the RDL as the number of malicious nodes increases.
C. DSR under Selfish Attack
The selfish attack simulation introduces very similar results
to the blackhole attack as the blackhole and selfish nodes share
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dropping data packets. This is because of the network through-
put, end-end-delay and routing overheads are calculated based
on the received data packets which are identical for the same
simulation scenario. The difference between simulation results
of selfish attack and blackhole attack is in the PDR and the
routing overhead. Figure 12 shows that the PDR for both
protocols is nearly constant in high node mobility and in static
nodes.
Figure 13 shows the effect of selfish attack on the routing
overhead. While the routing overhead increases as the number
of blackhole nodes increases in the network as mentioned in
figure 10, it decreases as the selfish nodes increase in the
network. This is logical as the selfish node drops all routing
messages routed through it.
D. DSR under Grayhole Attack
As the grayhole node drops all data packets and the
selfish node drops all data and routing packets, the grayhole
attack simulation introduces very similar results to the selfish
attack. The only major difference between simulation results
of grayhole attack and selfish attack is in the routing overhead.
Figure 14 shows that the routing overhead for both protocols
is nearly constant regardless the node mobility and malicious
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nodes number and is slightly decreases for DSR in static
network.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analysed the performance of both DSR
and its flow-state extension routing protocols under the black-
hole, grayhole, selfish and flooding attacks for different mo-
bility speeds. We conclude that the performance of the flow
extension of the DSR is better than original DSR in the
presence of blackhole, grayhole and selfish attacks. These
attacks have a more severe effect on static networks than on
high mobility networks.
We conclude as well that the flooding attacks have dramatic
impact on the network performance for the all the performance
metrics. On the other hand, all other attacks have remarkable
negative impact on the end-end-delay specially for static nodes
and less dangerous in the rest of the performance metrics.
Blackhole attack has dramatic impact on the PDR of the
original DSR in static network. As most of the performance
metrics depend on the number of received data packets, little
changes are observed in these metrics under blackhole, selfish
and grayhole attacks because the malicious nodes drop data
packets in these attacks.
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